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1. The actuality of the subject of regulations in the legal science
The survey of the theoretical problems of the internal regulations 
within the enterprises got into the foreground of the scientific research 
just in the last few years. It is mainly due to the formerly general view 
that the internal conditions should be regulated by legal rules primarily 
at the cooperatives. In the co-ops the owner is not separated from the 
propriety-organization as it is in the case of state enterprises. Followingly 
the shaping of the owner's will takes place ía.sá/e the organization and this 
should happen on a legally settled way. Since this process has a legally 
fixed order the organization, the internal conditions hardly require
to be legally regulatedd Therefore the attention was directed towards 
the collective agreement, we could seldom experience the independent, 
theoretical elaboration of the internal regulations. The authors dealt 
with them primarily in connection with other institutions of labour law — 
such as collective bargaining, right for instructions.2
As a result of the reaction to the challenge by the growing difficulties 
in the inner and outer economies the problem of modernizing the inner 
structure of enterprise came to the foreground. In the scientific literature 
dealing with labour law and the enterprises the increase of such surveys 
was indicated, which urged the theoretical shaping of the so-called "internal 
enterprisal law".
Now the need for clearing the theoretical problems of the internal 
regulations of the enterprises appeared with even more intensity. László 
Nagy (professor at Gödöllő University) in one of his books criticizes the 
lack of the theoretical elaboration of the enterprise level sources of law, 
the clearing of the relation to each other of these regulations and criticizes 
the science of labour law that it did not deal earlier with the organizational 
and operational regulation.2
The notion of the so-called "internal organizational law of enter­
prises" was adapted by Tamás Sárközy itt the Hungarian legal literature. 
The creation of his comprehensive enterprisal law theory is connected 
with the changed role of the enterprises in our economic life, their widened 
variety in form and type, the decrease of the direct influence of the state
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management organs, ttie increase oi entcrprisal imle]<endence and auto­
nomy. The substance of his system of views is, that as a consequence of 
the development of economic direction system and that of the internai 
organization of enterprises and for tiie sake of the further deveiopment 
it is the time to create a separated, independent branch of )aw, that aims 
the uniform regulation of the interna) and outer management relations 
of the enterprises and is separated from both the civil and administrative 
law. moreover from the labour law.'
Within this so-called internal organizational law would be regulated 
the establishment of the various internal organs of the enterprise, their 
composition, their basic operational forms, rights and duties, the main 
a])[)earancc forms of their relations.^
Re directs the focus of his attention first of all on the outer vertical 
and horizontal relations of the enterprises (i.e. the relations with the organs 
of economic direction and other economic units) and on the internal 
legal relations between the trust centers and their enterprises. He relatively 
less elaborates the shaping of the so-called internal law and the details 
concerning internal regulations.
H. The sphere of legal regulations inside the enterprises
One of the most discussed question right at the start-point, whether 
exsists a sphere at all for the formal law provisions within the enterprise 
ami what kind of provisions for?
Xaturally the so-called work rules to secure the internal order of the 
enterprises existed even earlier within the socialist state enterprise and 
there were also rules concerning the safeguarding of employees' interests — 
mainly regarding the individual labour relation. (These types of rules, of 
course, could be found practically since the early beginnings of factory- 
production till our days also in countries of capitalist economic system, 
but now we do not go in details about these historical questions)"
In the former our system of controlling economy by instructions, 
however, it was necessary and natural, that the central prescriptions 
were extended even to the smallest details of the internal organization 
and operation of enterprieses (e g. the obligatory instruction to set up 
certain spheres ot tasks, certain jobs) on one hand, the myth oftheone man 
responsibility of the enterprise director excluded every kind of legal settle­
ment. working out of any legal technical solution on the other hand. 
The opinion according to that the state enterprise is the lowest level 
executive organ of the public administration-also produced its influence 
on the internal organization of state enterprises. (The remnants of this 
point oi view can be iound even today in the background of some opinions 
concerning the internal regulations.) Consequently the internal organizati­
on oi state enterpises was virtually an extension of the public administ 
ration, it was an image reflected of the structural set-up of the ministries 
and other organs of state direction.
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^  lien changing the system of ec-fuiomic direction (i.c. the increasing 
independence of state enterprises), the State changed its expectations 
towards the enterprises of state property. Such a behavior is expected 
that aims the growing profit and ficxibty adapts itseif to the marked 
requirements, etc. At! these lias made necessary the change of the earlier 
structure of enterprises and at the same time the role of legal regulations 
came into the foreground.
Of course the role of the law cannot be interpreted on such a way 
as the change of the entcrprisal organisation itself would be the task of 
the law. because this is economic and organizational task. However, 
the problem appears that on one hand to what estent can be prescribed 
the internal structure of state enterprises by centra! rules, and — on the 
other hand — to what extent can be fixed the organizational decisions 
and provisions by forma! prescriptions within the enterprise. It is certainly 
true, that an organizational rule or provision does not turn into legal rule 
merely by the fact that it is formulated by lawyers. This would be an ex­
treme idea, but it would be similarly extreme statement to say that the 
internal norms oi enterpises are partly "social rules being "merely techni 
cal" or only "informative" rules and this way virtually to exclude the 
law from the life of the enterprises.
AH these aforesaid have particular importance from the view of 
labour law. Xamety when any decision or provision appears as internal 
rule, the adherence to its content becomes legal obligation for the parties 
in the employment relation. Followingly it appears as norm q/Teyu/ r/wruc- 
/cr, even if ?7 ?'.s an/ a /cyu/ rw/c at the same time. (The regulations of social 
organizations are, naturally, exceptions, they are really pure social norms 
without any legal characteristic, since the observance of them and the res­
ponsibility for it. is not based on a prior legal relation.)
Some experts share the point of view that the settlement of the internal 
organizational relations in legal rules would make rigid and bureaucratic 
the internal life of the enterprise, hinds too much the hands of the director, 
followingly hinders the emergence of the dynamic enterprisal leadership, 
that is able to react rapidly to the changes. Although these fears direct 
our attention onto a real danger, we should not agree with them uncondi­
tionally. The order of the production and organizational life requires, 
indeed, the exsistance of several rules. This is not overgrown bureaucreacy 
yet. It begins when instead of the common interests the offices' interests 
determines the content of rules and the process of deciding or settling 
cases."
There were internal rules and various provisions formerly as well in 
the socialist enterprises. \\ hat is a new phenomenon, is the need for a 
settlement of the internal organization by legal rules with an obligatory 
character towards the enterprise manegement as well as the lower internal 
units and organs. First of all the problem of the independence of the enter­
prisal internal units caused heated debates. At first in the works of Tamas 
Sarkozy was claimed, that we must give up the rigid exaggeration of the 
otherwise appropriate principle—namely that the enterprisal independence
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cannot be mechanically transferred to the independence of the enter- 
prisal units."*'
Consequently one of the important tasks of the internal organizational 
law, proposed by him to be created, would be the regulation of the mutual 
relationship between the internal units and their relation to the company- 
center in such a way that internal units should gain greater independency. 
Their economic activity would be the less dependent on the work of other 
units as it is possible, and the results should be presented separately 
in the books of the enterprise. The creation of such a solution would make 
the stimulation of the employees more direct, consequently more effective. 
Despite of the evidently advantageous effects of this idea, we cannot say 
that it was accepted unanimously in the literature."
At any rate the Act on State Enterprises (Act No. VI of 1977) imposed 
on enterprise directors that they are obliged to provide the establishment 
of the independent accounting system of the larger units of the enterprise 
in the regulation on organizational structure and operation." Though the 
scientific discussions are not decided solely by the legal provision, the 
solutions based on it provided plenty of generally useful experiences for 
the theoreticians. (Naturally it ought to be mentioned that it is primarily 
a task for economics to ensure the conditions for the independent economy 
of internal units, to work out their independent accounting system and 
separated statements on production results. The lawyers' activity is merely 
to put these conditions into legal forms and provide them with guarantees.)
The development of the independence of the internal units in the 
enterprise is only one of the internal organisational problems, that requires 
legal regulation. The abovementioned organizational and operational 
regulation makes arrangements on further important problems as well 
(e.g. the legal status of the internal organs of the enterprise, the legal 
status of the director, his relation to his deputies, the legal status of the 
enterprise organs of social and political organizations, etc.)
III. Problems of legal branch classifications in connection with internal 
regulations of enterprises
The provisions in the structural and operational regulation, do not 
affect directly the individual labour relations. This fact stirred disputes 
in the literature concerning the legal branch classification of the different 
groups of internal regulations. The substance of the discussions is whether 
those rules belong mainly to the labour law or they belong just partly 
to the labour law, and partly to the new branch of law named "internal 
organizational law of enterprises". There is a third view, according to that 
labour law should be inserted into the enterprisal law, therefore it does 
not recognize labour regulations inside the state enterprise.*"
Naturally this last opinion is just as extreme as another one, namely 
that "the whole internal life of the enterprise is of labour law character."** 
Inevitably the following statement can be interpreted as saying this 
extreme opinion: "When the internal rules are realized by the activity
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of the members of the organization, who are subjects of employment 
reiation, then these ruies can be only employers' acts, followingly these 
are acts, regulating labour relations. *-
However, I would put the emphasis on the word: "when", because 
I presume that those persons and groups of persons who make the production 
and economic activities of the enterprise, are in double role. Primarily 
they are employees, secondarily they are elements of the organization. 
This double role is explained on a very convincing way by Laszlo Román 
in connection with the role of the company director so as to separate the 
directions issued by the supervisory organs adressed to the director as 
an employee (employed by the supervisory organ) from those adressed to 
the enterprise as an economic unit, as organization.^ It could happen 
that the two kinds of instructions arrives to the adressed person in one 
single act, we have, all the same, to distinguish theoretically between the 
instructions adressed to two kinds of adressées: one to the person as an 
employee, the other to the organisation (organisational unit).
According to my point of view the same distinction, even if merely 
theoretically, could be made at a lower rank of managers, or even in the 
case of employees, who perform the simplest type of activities. (It is true, 
that proceeding downstairs on the enterprisal hierarchy it is even more 
difficult to separate the purely employer's instructions from the "organi­
zational instructions" addressed to an organizational "element".)
Therefore among the internal rules of the enterprise we really can 
distinguish between labour regulations and rules of other branch of law. 
Of course, there are regulations miscellaneously containing rules of labour 
law and rules belonging to other branch of law. Actually, such a rule is 
the structural and operational regulation of the enterprise, the regulation 
on innovations and the system of job descriptions.
All these do mean for me that it is unnecessary to overemphasize 
the importance of the branch classification of the rules inside the enterprise, 
because in several cases the same provision can be ranged into the territory 
of more than one legal branch. Due to the "miniaturization" of the living 
conditions, the problems of division appear more frequently than it is 
in the law "outside the enterprise" and in the meanwhile their importance 
is less. (Moreover so, because the employee is obliged to follow the provisions 
concerning his job regardless of its classification to a legal branch.)
The division of internal rules to labour law and non labour rules —ap­
peared first in the book of Laszlo Nagy (professor at Szeged University) 
Although several contrary opinions have been emerged, I consider it beyond 
any doubt that today there are many norms concerning to the organization 
and its operation the objects of which fall far from the conditions settled 
bv labour law. At the same time I do not agree with his opinion, accor­
ding to which some of the internal regulations are of "non-legal cha­
racter". Really there are norms of counduct having no-legal character. As 
I have mentioned earlier, could be considered as non-legal, purely social 
norms those regulating the internal life of a social or political organization. 
(For example the basic rules of the trade unions, the youth organizations
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or the party.) Hut when a provision regulates the rights and duties of per­
sons who are engaged in employment relation, especially the rights and 
duties established ?'?; accordu/me M'?VA /Ac ddec/or o/* /Ac eH/erpr/se though by 
the enterprise level organ of trade union —it cannot be said to be purely 
social norm."
The complex character of the internal relations in the enterprise 
lead to similar differences of opinions in the Soviet legal science as well.
In his book dealing with the local and central labour norms Kondratiev 
says that "on the basis that the labour activity of human beings takes 
always place among certain organizational forms, emerged in the labour 
law the point of view according to which the organizational (administrative) 
relations within the enterprises actually constitute integral part of the 
labour relations." Further on he refers to Alexandrov, Paskov and 0. V. 
Szmirnov as outstanding legal scientists sharing this view. Me quotes then 
Protsevsky from the authors having contrary opinion. Protsevsky writes, 
according to me properly, that the "organizational relations are closely 
connected with the labour relations, but they are not mixed with them 
and are not even components of the latter."^
I agree with this latter statement but we have to admit that the au­
thors considering organizational relations as part of labour relations do 
not commit the mistake to consider every interna! relation within the 
enterprise to be relation of labour law. This is proven by a statement by 
the formerly mentioned O. V. Smirnov who in his book on the "Internal 
work-order of enterprises" challenges the statement that the internal 
work-order of an enterprise would be the sum of the legal relations rising 
within the workers' collective in the course of performing the tasks of 
production. According to him that opinion "combines the internal work- 
order into a conglomerate of those relations regulated by public administ­
ration law, civil law and other branches of law". Due to this the internal 
work-order "leaves its branch identity" — says O. V. Smirnov. The term 
of the internal work-order should be narrowed down to the sphere of 
relations regulated by labour norms.'"
In the Soviet literature it could be experienced that authors during 
the survey of the internal relations of the enterprise virtually without 
exception they arrive to the meaningless notion of the "internal work-order 
of the enterprise". It is not likely that it is some kind of subjective failure 
on the side of the researchers. It is much more obvious that it signs the 
difficulty of classification of the relations emerging in an enterprise. 
These difficulties may cause the fact that although the work-order has 
a quite large literature in socialist countries (primarily in the Soviet Union 
and the GDR), it cannot be stated that a uniform view would have appea­
red even as far as the term itself is concerned. The work-order is taken as 
a sum of legal rules, the form of legal order realized within the enterprise, 
the sum of legal relations and — as we have seen in the above examples — the 
sum of production relations within the enterprise, too.
It is interesting to compare it to the term "industrial relations" 
what is used in the West. It appears more and more frequently in the
120___________  ________ CSILLA LEHOCXKY
litem tore dealing with the internal relations of the enterprises (first of 
all with the problems of labour and personnel administration) and seems 
to be also an obscure, uncleared notion. I even dare say that the content 
awl sphere of the two terms (included conditions ami institutions in them) 
are almost identical, except naturally those differences due to the dif­
ference between the two social order and the various historical and legal 
development traditions.
This opinion of mine is confirmed by the next quotation: "A system 
of industrial relations is a system of rules. . . . the subject deals with 
certain regulated or institutionalised reationships in industry. Personal, 
or in the language of sociology, unstructured relationships have their 
importance for management and workers but they lie outside the scope 
of a system of industrial relations. The study of industrial relations may 
therefore be described as a study of the institutions of job regulation."'''
IV. The relation between enterprise regulations and statutory laws
László Nagy (professor at Szeged University) states that there are 
three main differences between the labour regulations and the other 
kinds of regulations. The first one is that the base for the organizational 
rules is the State Enterprise Act. while the internal rules of labour law 
are based on the Labour Code. The second factor is to lie found in the 
content and sphere of regulations. According to him the Enterprise Act 
gives authorization only for applying the law instead of establishing new 
rights and duties. 'The conditions of employment relation may be set up 
by internal rules only upon the authorization of a Labour Code provision. 
The third difference is in the possibility to enforce the provisions. The 
enforcement of the internal regulations of enterprises depends only on 
the authority of the director while state-provided enforcement can be 
used to have observed the labour regulations as in the case of any other laws.'R
He uses these statements at the same time to support his theory 
according to which the labour regulations of the enterprises constitute 
the lowest level of the statutory legislation.'"
He represents a group of views in the Hungarian legal science accor­
ding to which the internal regulations (or some of them) arc close to the 
statutory law and have similar legal character. Airs. Ida Hágelmayer, 
for example, considers the collective bargainig of the enterprise as regula­
tion, as a special kind of genera) acts, that is, in the terms of legal nature, 
close to the statutory rules.'-" Tamás Sárküzy calls the regulation on organi­
zation and operation as "a special kind of legal sources. Though he calls 
it "social norm basing on statutory provisions" we have to connect him 
to the representatives of the above mentioned group of views on the ground 
of his arguments for legal source character. For example he states that 
it is just some "remnant of etatism" to consider legislation as monopoly 
of the State."-"/a (I suppose that surveying the theoretical substance of his 
opinion it does not matter that he does not consider every kind of internal 
rules having the same legal force.)
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Certainly the fact that the internal rules are putting central provisions 
concretely takes them closer to such legal rules as are decrees and orders. 
However, this circumstance should not lead us to such a reverse conclusion 
that each legal act putting a central provision concretely, must be legis­
lation act at the same time.
Similar views can be traced in the literature of the other socialist 
countries. Only for the sake of illustration we can mention that in the 
Soviet Union Sarkisov calls the local regulation on work performance 
to be "the joint legislative activity of the enterprise-admimistration and 
the local organ of trade union, in the course of which the State-level and 
branch level norms are concretized and detailed in a procedure prescribed 
by law. In some cases it is also aimed to fill in the gaps of labour law." 
According to him the local norm possess the most of the criteria of statu­
tory norms: it contains obligatory rules for anyone and its provisions are 
of general character. Their specific character is considered by the author 
to be in the fact that their sphere of territorial and personal competence 
is limited and that one of the acting subjects will be the passive subject 
oi this "legislation ' at the same time. (H.g. the workers' collective appears 
in double role.)2*
Quite a lot of common characteristics can be found in these views 
and in Taly's views who were, however, strongly criticized by socialist 
jurisprudence. Namely, he says that the law created by the internal 
rules is of /Ac pos?/?re /o?c. Its specific feature is that
its sphere of effectiveness confines itself to the framework of the given 
social organization.2-
There is no doubt that within the complex world of law there are 
a lot of transitions and the limits are either effaced or hardly differentiated 
between the categories, between the positive law and subjective law, 
the legislatif)n and legal practice, the legal rules and concrete norms. Our 
terms such as "legal rule", "legal source" do not have an exact, permanently 
valid definition, in different aspects they acquire different meaning. All 
the same, this fact should not give a chance for the artificial "relativisation" 
of the terms in order to fade the existing and readable limits.
In the Marxist legal science it is an unchanged view that the law 
is the intention of the ruling class, raised to the level of legislation. This 
thrsis is containing that ?'n, /Ac oAjcr/A'e .scH3c could be considered as law 
only the norms issued by organs entitled to express the intention of the 
ruling class, i.e. from the organs of the state authorities and public admi­
nistration, or from other state organs authorized to legislate.
Consequently the creation of the interna! rules of the enterprise is 
not law and legislation -  neither those of "labour"-character, nor those 
of "organizational"-character.
It is a frequent argumentation that state enterprises, though not 
legislature organs, have acquired legislative competence, within the frame­
work and limits set by law, by the authorization from state legislature to 
create regulations (collective agreement, regulation on structure and ope­
ration).^ Therefore behind them stands the pou rr f/w/ m/ca/mM,
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what is needed to be for the recognition of any norm as statutory act. 
Indeed, the legislator stands behind the regulating enterprises, but is 
not identical with them. László Román elaborates in his paper on the 
internal regulations that we have to recognize the difference between 
the expression of the will of the ruling class and the expression of a will, 
that is accordance with the intention of the ruling class.
I share also the opinion that the obligation or authorization of the 
enterprises (or other organs) to create internal rules does no/ mean /Ac 
de?e<?a??'on o/ /Ac %ey;s?a/d;e compe/ence o/* /Ac g/a/e. I t means, quite the cont­
rary, that the given life-condition or group of conditions remain outside 
of the regulation by the State. In the designed framework the legislator 
did not intend to bind the behaviour of the subjects by further law 
regulations. Therefore the partners do excercise their rights given by law 
or fulfill their duties, when settling up further rules of conduct for themsel­
ves within the bounds left by law for action, i.e. they put concretely the 
rights and duties provided by objective law.-*
Consequently the legal act for setting up the internal rules of the 
enterprise is not legislation, it is legal p r a c t i c e . ^  Therefore, the difference, 
mentioned by László Nagy, between the rules based on the Enterprise 
Act and Labour Code, i.e. that the former "authorizes only for legal prac­
tice, but cannot create new rights and duties", we cannot evaluate as real 
difference, considering that both types of rules can only concretize, in 
different extent and framework but in basic type similarly, the rights 
and duties already established by law.
Then the internal rules are not legal sources ? In the generally accepted 
stricter meaning of the word they are, really, not. Hut in a wider sense, 
in which we consider even a contract to be a legal source, they are also 
legal sources. (We cannot be blamed that we accept the "false ways" of 
Kelsen by this statement, because we make conscious, specific distinction 
between the substantive law created by the State, and the subjective 
law practiced by the partners.) When recognizing their "legal source" 
character we cannot ignore that the base of their obligatory nature is 
primarily of contractual character: it depends on the labour contract 
established with the individual employees.
We can proceed to the next main argument of the representatives of 
the view bringing the internal rules close to the law: it is the compulsory 
power of the state provided for these regulation's observance. But this is 
nothing more like the enforcement that ensures the performance of duties 
and the assessment of the rights originated from the legal relations, estab­
lished basing upon the law provisions.
According to the earlier quoted view- '^ there is an important difference 
between the labour law and non-labour (organizational) regulations within 
the enterprise. That is while for the latter the single base to enforce them 
is only the manager's right of direction, the assertion of the labour 
rules is supported by the possibility of the available means of state-enfor­
cement.
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As far as ! am concerned ! do not see any substantia) difference 
between the possibilities of enforcement, because f think that the uMr/7/ou 
/Ac cM/erpr/.w is ensured by the directive right of the manager in 
both groups of rules. Hven in the cases of such rights that are pr^ided 
by the collective agreement and therefore could be taken on judicial 
proceedings, the enterprise would not turn to the judicial organs. (H.g. 
for securing the fixed term of notice or even for forcing the employee 
to do some overwork, that is not beyond the limit set by the collective 
agïcemcnt.) In both cases the enforcement will be done only by using the 
directive power and disciplinary rights of the director. It is another question 
that if the employee does not agree w ith the measures or sanctions inflicted 
by the enterprise executives, he is entitled to turn to the organs established 
for deciding labour disputes. Consequently the assesment of rules with 
taking the help of the state power happens only by the employees. At these 
conditions the only group of provisions in respect of which we cannot 
see the presence of any legal means or measures to enforce them is the group 
of provisions of organizational character staying outside the conractual 
relation between the employee and employer.'Namely if the independence 
or autonomy of some internal unit or organ, given by the organizational 
and operational regulation of the enterprise, is injured by the director 
or other management executive the given unit (i.e. the workers' collective 
of the unit or the person w ho is charge of this operation) has no possibili­
té turn to any organ w ith competence to settle the given dispute. (Labour 
court. that is appointed to decide the labour disputes is available only 
for ??/;?/// employees as subjects of the individual employment relation.)
! he lack of legal measures and forums does not appear, therefore, in addi 
tion to the direction power of the director, but ur/M?M.s/ ?V. And this does 
not shaw a notable difference betw een the two types of rules (of organiza­
tional and labour character) but does show the existing legal gap in the 
valid statutory taw.
1 he necessary elimination of this gap could be. perhaps, associated 
with a general settlement of the legal way of collective disputes. This 
latter is claimed more times in the professional literature but there is 
no statutory solution elaborated up to the present. All the same, we have 
to use strongly "conditional mood" when speaking about the general 
settlement because the disputes concerned are arised front different types 
of clashes of interests. Therefore it is doubtful anti must be investigated 
w hether they can be solved in identical procedure. In the so-called "collec­
tive disputes' the clashes of interests between employees and the cmplovcr 
are in the foreground. But when the dispute takes place about the obser­
vation of the interna! rules, it is arisen between the different
patts (units) of the organization, all of them serving the unitv and integ­
ral organizational targets.
The single point where a denotation can he made between the internal 
regulation according to their branch classification is, according to mv 
opinion. the here mentioned difference between the affected social rela­
tions and interests.
*24_____________________________________  CSILLA [.HHOCZKY
in László Roman's views t he creation of any internal regulation 
is nothing else than the exercising of employer's rights considering that 
in some form or other the content of every provision becomes the duty 
of the employees. At the same time he also admits that the organizational 
and operational regulation serves mainly the interests of the employer, 
the collective agreement serves mainly the interests of the employee.*?
Although this statement is doubtless. 1 would formulate it more pro­
perly: the collective agreement involves the interest ot the employees, 
the organizational regulation </w.s an/ r/^ fee/ the employees' interests. 
Surely, some provision can involve the interest of one of the partners only 
if it affects the interest of the other. Followingly we could not speak about 
provisions involving the interest solely of the "employer." If it regulates 
in the sphere of cwp/oycr-cmpioycc re/u/ma, i.e. it affects the rightsand duties 
belonging to the partners as employees or employer, it will affect the 
interest of the employees too. The provisions of enterprise's regulation 
on organization and operation (or most of them) does not affect directly 
the relation between the employee and employer, i.e. they can be consi­
dered neutral as far as the safeguarding of employees' interests are concerned.
Since in my view the function of labour law is mainly the protection 
of the employees' interest amidst the circumstances of the employment 
relation prevailed by the power of employer, therefore we should regard 
internal rules to be of labour law character just if they appear in the relation 
of employee-employer, with a content of safeguarding of emplovces' 
interests. Otherwise we will have to consider as rules of labour law character 
even those indifferent in the respect of employees' interests. And followinglv 
we would have come to the wrong conclusion that "the whole life inside 
the enterprise is of labour law character" since in the last analysis every­
thing, what happens inside the enterprise, is in connection with the work 
perfomance of somebody of employees.
Finally we have to deal with the last argument of the view claiming 
the close relationship between internal regulations and statutory law. 
This is the following: the internal rules have regulative, normatív character 
like statutory provisions. About this statement already several researchers 
has proved that is oversimplified and consequently wrong, t hey have 
demonstrated, mainly in connection with the researches on the legal 
nature of collective agreement— that the normative character is not only 
a feature of statutory provisions, moreover, even an individual contract 
between two persons can have normative elements. Therefore this point 
need not detain us.-**
V. The contractual character of the regulations
Several levels and kinds of regulations can be found at enterprises. 
W e may reckon as the two most important ones the organizational ami 
operational regulation and the collective agreement. These two regulation 
virtually embody the two kinds of provisions presented above, those of 
labour and organizational character.
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The collective agreement inevitably contains provisions affecting 
(and safeguarding) the employees' interests, moreover, involves those 
of basic importance. This explains the specific process of its creation, 
its legal form, namely that it is created by the agreement between the 
director and the enterprise comittee or council of trade union representing 
the workers' collective of the enterprise. The draft must be discussed 
with the employees before signing.
This fact prompted Tamás Sárközy to divide the internal regulations 
in two opposite groups. These are: the regulation of organization and opera­
tion or the organizational rules in general on one hand and the agreement- 
norms on the other. "It is quite an other type of legal relations when a 
legal act issued by one of the internal organs needs the approval of another 
organ (its consent or not to raise a veto) against when two internal organ 
takes on mutually obligations, even if the sociological literature put them 
together under the title of "bargain".3°
Really, it is not the same that a legal act is formulated by one decisive 
intention and relating to this intention the other one is of supplementary 
and "extern" character or both of them are equal and regarded as "intern" 
in the respect of the given act. All the same I cannot agree completely 
with Tamás Sárközy's point of view because he contrasts on the ground 
between "agreements" and "other regulations" in the respect of then- 
legal nature, legal substance. There above mentioned difference results 
on/y /Ac q/ /Ac (eyrd /or?n, but behind the different legal forms we
have to see the same legal substance: both of them are rey:da/?0MS, i.e. 
norms or groups of norms arranging the internal order of an organization.
Now we are arriving to a much disputed problem: the relation between 
"substance" and "form" in connection with the notion of regulation.
László Román criticizes those theoreticians who formulate the question 
as "contract or law", when determining the legal character of collective 
agreement. He says that this way we compare non-identical legal qualities. 
The contract is a legal form, but it is a substantial problem whether 
something contains rules and provisions, I think that the way of putting 
the question should not be condemned on this ground because it is also 
the question of form that some provision is shaped as act, order, decree —in 
a word: statutory law. Even László Román himself writes: statutory 
rule it is the source of law in the formal meaning of the word.s* I agree 
with Mrs. Hágelmayer who writes: "Both statutory rule and contract —are 
forms presenting some kind of substance"^ therefore the fault of the above 
mentioned way of putting the question is not that it compares different 
legal qualities, but it is that causes the choice of answeres to become 
narrower. In other words it excludes every kind of third quality, moreover 
it answeres only the form, but does not give an answer to the question 
of substance, namely that the collective agreement and the other internal 
normative measures constitute a common category: they all are reyida/ioMN.
László Román states: "The regulation as a term etymologically belongs 
to the genus of rules; the regulation is a specific kind of acts with normative 
content. According to our view the term "regulation" is fitting for those
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normative acts which refer to the internal operation of the organizations. 
It serves the more or less comprehensive, durable settlement of the interna! 
oirfer (or some element of the internal order) and it is frequently used in 
the meaning of rules of order ("statútum", "reglement").33
On the contrary Mrs. Ida Hagelmayer, though regarding the collective 
agreement also to be a "special form of regulation", emphasizes that the 
term of "regulation" is used to denote the /orm, namely to mark the form 
of general acts with specific legal nature yet under discussions.3'
But this way we repeatedly evade the answer to the problem of 
legal nature. And, in addition, this statement is contradicted by the fact 
that regulations (i.e. provisions on internal operation of some organ), 
as far as their content is concerned, may appear in t'ar?OMS /rye/ /oryns. 
E.g. the regulations of organization and operation of the county-, city- and 
district-councils appear as council's decrees.3" But regulation may appear 
in the form of unilateral managerial direction, i.e. as employer's direction 
and, according to my view, it may finally appear as agreement, i.e. in the 
form of contract too.
Contract and regulation —they are in the position of substance 
and form in abstracto. However, it is yet questionable whether they can 
get into the position of substance and form in concrete ? Whether regula- 
tional content can appear in contractual form? This question is, actually, 
answered in the negative by the majority of labour law experts although 
there are authors (primarily representativess of other branches of law) 
who regard the contemporary Hungarian collective agreement to be a 
real contract. It seems that at the same time they do separate it from 
the other, unilateral type of internal regulations. This is done, for example, 
by Tamás Sárközy in his above quoted statement, but the same separation 
is hinted by his "de lege ferenda" proposition. Namely, that the collective 
agreement should be regulated in Labour Code as more real contract, 
created to equalize the different interests inside the enterprise and as such 
"specific contract" it should include the other regulations that could be 
transformed into the form of agreement.3"
A contrary opinion most sharply formulated can be found at László 
Román: ". . .regulation and contract —fire and water, they are irreconci­
lable contrasts."3?
László Roman find this contrast to be existing despite the fact, 
that he strongly separates the general term of contract from its civil law 
version. He notes that the term of contract cannot be connected with 
the term of ware-relationships, not even historically, because the term 
of contract was known already before the ware-producing societies. (For 
example he refers to the compact scaled with blood.)
We can find the definition of the term of contract in the university 
textbook of Hungarian civil law. It is definited in more steps. First it is 
quite general and acceptable even for us here: "The contract is a unani­
mous expression of their will by two or more persons, bringing about 
legal effect. Legally free wills are expressed by the partners and by this
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means they make their wills to be mutually binded in accordance with 
the content of the contract."^
I'he latter features, however, characterize only the civil law contract, 
although the textbook regards them generally as characteristics of the 
term of contract. Such features arc: the quid-pro-quo status and the equi­
valence in value between the given services, the economic constraint stan­
ding behind the legally free wills. All these features appear as consequences 
of the contractual substance that "the contract is form, the change of 
goods is substance and the latter determines the former."-*"
The substance of every contract would be the change of goods? 
Xo, our answer is "not". We have to recognize here, how it is when a 
general category of law (here: "contract") is identified with one of its 
special forms appearing in a given branch of law (here: the civil law) just 
because historically its legal dogmatics primarily had developed in the 
given branch of law. We can meet similar phenomenon in connection 
with the term of "legal subject": the legal science identified it for a long 
time with it equivalent in the civil law. Therefore the view that starts 
to establish a more general term of legal subject can make way very hardly.
It is recognized even by the science of civil law that the contract as 
form can be detached from its content and can become the form of such 
agreements w hich contains no change of goods and therefore there is no 
question about the equivalence of values. From the aspect of civil law 
we should, however, consider it just as an exception.
Beside the civil law we can find the institution of "contract" in cons­
titutional law , international law, public administration law, labour law 
and co-operative law too. The change of goods cannot be considered as 
typical content of contract in these branches of law*. I lere we have to regard 
as contractual substance the mutual undertaking, or, in wider sense, 
when the formerly free wills are made binded voluntarily and mutually. 
But this must be more than mutual obligation merely to keep and apply 
certain provisions —states László Román. To undertake something 
towards another person —this is the "contract" in the most abstract 
sense of the word, he says.'" Wet), tnis way we are getting back near 
to the substance of "change of goods" as contract-substance, even if we 
do not want to do so. But when we are really able to detache from the 
classical notion of contract, we have to accept as "mutual obligation" 
if &*//; of /ác pur/Mcos /o/,c o?? ywcrc/y /o oó.serrc rcr/u/a ra/os.
This is —and no more —the typical content of the international 
law agreements too, especially of those counted as legal sources. (The 
science of international law distinguishes betw een tw o kinds of internatio­
nal agreements: those called legal sources on one hand and those of admi­
nistrative type on the other.)^*
The interna] regulations created by agreement also have the same 
content of obligation. As a final conclusion it could be stated that the 
internal rules at state enterprises are legal acts belonging to the sphere 
of legal practice and they may be classified actually into the traditional 
legal categories.
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A part of them, concerning to the organization and operation of the 
enterprise, has no direct effect to the rights and duties originating from 
employment reiation, therefore they are neutrai provisions as far as the 
protection of interests is concerned. Their importance increases nowadays 
when an increasing roie is obtained by the smaHer units in production­
organizing, in stimulating the increase of productivity of production and 
the iegai guarantees of the smaHer units' independence are iaid down in 
the reguiations of this kind. The rules in this group appear as unilateral 
acts of the enterprise director but this does not mean that they become 
the domain of the directors' free will. They are created partly jointly 
with the managing bodies of the company, partly with the participation 
of the forums of enterprise democracy (with their approval, by asking 
their opinion etc.). The content of the regulations must be formulated 
or changed only in the legally settled way. Conseqently the director is 
not allowed to put the rules aside unilaterally.
The other great part of the internal regulations consists of the rules 
concerning directly the employment relationship, so having importance 
primarily in respect of the protection of workers' interests. They appear 
in the form of contract or agreement.
it  is a further task to make clear how is the relation (differences and 
common characteristics) between the mutually created acts called "agree­
ment" (increased lately in both socialist and capitalist countries) on the 
one hand and the classical notion of "contract" on the other. The common 
substance they have is that they contain bargaining between the parties 
having controversial interests and their fixed consentment. This character 
does not appear sharply in the settlement created at the socialist state 
enterprises considering the final basic common interests of the empolyer 
and employees. However, my opinion is that the bargaining character 
of these settlements must be increased, i.e. making available the widest 
channels for expressing the direct clash of interests and promoting their 
reconciliation this way.
FO O T N O T E S
' See: Gytda Eőrsi'.* T he basic  p rob lem s o f th o  soc iahst civ!] law . B ook  p u b lish ers  o f 
"A kadém ia i K ia d ó " , B u d ap es t, 1965. 219. p.
- See f irs t o f all: Ld-szM Mwadn.' Legal n a tu re  o f  th e  o rg an iza tio n a l ty p e  o f in te rn a l 
reg u la tions w ith  special reg ard  to  th e  collective ag reem en t. S tu d ia  Iu rid ica  A u c to rita te  
U n iv e rsita tis  P écs P u b lica ta . No. 67. Pécs, 1979. (F u rth e r  on  a b b re v ia te d  as: " In te rn a l  
R egu la tions"); Aá.sz/ó ffontdn.' Tho fu n d am en ta l p rob lem s o f th e  em p lo y er's  r ig h t to  g ive  
in stru c tio n s. Book P u b lish e rs  o f „A kadém ia i K iadó , "B u d a p es t, 1972. pp . 163 — 295. (F u r th ­
e r  on  a b b rev ia te d  as: "R ig h t to  give in stru c tio n s"); LdszM A'ayy. T he system  an d  p rac tice  
o f  collective ag reem en ts. T áncsics B ook  P u b lishers. B u d ap es t, 1976. pp . 7 — 17.; A irs, 7da 
ifdye/tnayer. B asic questions o f  th e  collective ag reem en t. B ook P u b lish e rs  o f „A kadém ia i 
K iad ó " , B u d ap es t, 1977. pp . 319 — 342. (F u r th e r  on  a b b rev ia te d  as: "C ollective ag reem en t").
3 Td-szM A'ayy.' B asic p rob lem s of th e  co -opera tive  law . Book P u b lish e r o f "A k ad ém ia i 
K ia d ó " , B u d a p e s t. 1977. p. 278.
'  77; wd.s ,SdrMzy. To th e  legal sc ien tific  bases o f th e  socialist th e o ry  o f  en te rp rise . B ook 
P ublishers: "G azdaság i és Jo g i K iad ó " , B udapest , 1981, pp. 19 — 31. (F u r th e r  on  a b b re v ia te d  
as: "E n te rp rise  th eo ry " .)
9  ANNALES Srctio U K 9 IC A  -  Tomus XXIV.
SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 129
3 77!7MÚ.y áfd7*&özt/.' Legal regu la tion  on th e  o rg an iza tio n al an d  o p e ra tio n a l re la tions 
inside th e  en te rp rise . P eriod ical: "A llan t és Jo g tu d o m án y "  198ft. (Xo. 4. p. 577. (F u rth e r  
on a b b re v ia te d  as: "O rg an iza tio n a l an d  o p e ra tio n a l re la tio n s".)
s See th e  speech by  P rim e M inister G yö rg y  L ázár a t th e  X I 1. Congress o f the  H SW P. 
Sec: P e rio d ical "K özgazdaság i Szem le", 1989) Xo. 4. p. 52S.
" 7V3??!d<<? iSdrAöz?/.' O rg an iza tio n a l a n d  o p e ra tio n a l re la tio n s , p. 577.
s /bM/rds T heo re tica l q u estio n s re la ted  to  th e  legal regu la tion  of th e  in te rn a l
m echanism  o f s ta te  en te rp rises . See: in th e  Volum e "F n te rp r is a !  m anagem en t an d  th e  legal 
s ta tu s  o f  th e  en te rp rises ."  Hook Publishers: "K özgazdaság i és Jo g i K iadd". B udapest. 1978. 
pp . 1 8 7 -1 8 9 .
9 A ct X o. VJ. o f 1977. § 13. (1) a n d  (2).
'^S ee : f/7/?do /%7\sZ. L aw . Fconom y. Division o f Legal System . Book P ublishers "A k a­
dém iai K iadd". B udapest, 1977. pp. 133 134.
"  7'n//id.vXdrA*ö;://. O rg an iza tio n a l and  o p era tio n a l re la tions, p. 597.
*- Aú.sz/d //o77iÚ7t. In te rn a l reg u la tio n , p. 597.
Po??iÓM.* L ab o u r L aw . F acu lty  T ex tb o o k . (P a r t .)  Publisher o f T ex tbooks 
"T a n k ö n y v k ia d ó " , B u d ap est, 1979. p. 25.
'* F a th e r  Ad^z/d Auyj/ considered  as such  social norm  th e  en te rp rise  regu la tion  on 
"v e te ra n  em ployees", w hich is, since th e  m odification  o f L ab o u r Code in 1989, considered 
by  him  to  be "a  tran s itio n  betw een th e  soeial titles and  th e  o th e r  decisions issued bv the  
en te rp rise  d irec to r" . — since th e  d irec to r an d  th e  union c rea tes  it jo in tly . Ad#z/d Ara/t/. The 
system  of lab o u r law  titles. P a p e r on cod ification . (M anuscrip t.) 1982. p. 3 !. ( F u t tite r on 
a b b rev ia te d  as: "C odification  p ap é t" ) .
'S A'. / .  Ko/a/roA'cr. S o ch c tan ieccn tra lizo v an n o g o  ilo k a ln o g o p rav o v o g o  rogulirovaniva 
tru d o v y h  o tnosen ii. (The connection  of th e  cen tra! an d  local regu la tion  on lab o u r relations.) 
Izd a tc lsz tv o  Lvovskogo G ossu d a ts tv cn n o g o  C n iv ers ite ta . L vov. 1977. p. 19.
'6 Q . C. V n u tten y  tru d o v o y  rasp o ry ad o k . (The in te n ta i  w otk o td e r  o f the
en te rp rise) Izd a te ls tv o  L eningradskogo  C n iv ers ite ta . L ettin g tad . 1980. p. 32.
'7 A//nH In d u stria l re la tions: W hat is W rong w ith  th e  S y stem ?  (F ab er &
F ab e r, 1975. p. 19.) Q uoted  by  Derek T o rring ton&  Jo h n  C hapm an: Personnel M anagem ent. 
(P re n tic e  H all In te rn a tio n a l, 1979, London) p. 27.
'R Adsz/d A'uyt/.' C odification  pap er. 4! 43. p.
's  Ad^z/d Alayy; C odifientiott pttpet . p. 24.
-o 1 /rs . /do //ot/c/70o7/cr.' Collective ag reem en t, p. 333 343.
-^/a 7'o/MÓs XdrAdz//; op. c it. p. 594.
2 'X u r/r i .w r.S o c ia ln o e p la n iro v a n ie ra z v itiy a  ttttd o v o g o k o lle k iiv a  i loktthtoe reguli- 
rovan iyeh  ttn d tt na p to izv odstve ttnyh  p re d p rijn tiy a h . (Social plattttittg  o f th e  developm ent 
o f w orkers ' co llectives and  th e  local regu la tion  of w otk  a t  th e  p roducing  en te rp rises and  co­
operatives.) In  th e  volum e: C chastiyc  tru d o v y h  ko llek tiv ah  v up rav len n ii pro izvodstvom . 
(The p a rtic ip a tio n  of w orkers' co llectives in th e  en te rp rise  nnm agonien t.) p. 197.
-- A ccotding to  (). V. Sm irnov  th is  s ta te m en t hides th e  su b stan ce  th a t ex is ts behind 
th e  law . We should  agree w ith  him  on th a t .  See: Sm irnov: ib id . p. ! 32.
-3 .1//*.'?. Vdu //dyr/;M u/rr.' T he collective agreem ent, p. 341 —343.; Ad.tr/d A'uyy; Codi­
fica tion  p ap er, p. 29.; 7'uMids A'drArdz//.* In te rn a l o rg an iza tio n  and o p era tio n , p. 579.
2* In  th e  Soviet lite ra tu re  K o n d ra tiev  calls a tte n tio n  to  th e  d ifference betw een the 
norm s o f co n cré tisa tion  a n d  those  o f d iffe ren tia tio n . K on d ra tiev : ib id . p . 43.
23 Ad^z/d V/o?/idn. In te rn a l regu la tions, p. 24.
26 Sec: foo tno te  X r. 18.
27 Ad.?r/d /?077aÍ77.' In te rn a l regu la tions, p. 8.
26 c. g. Ad.sz/d/?o777d7i.' In te rn a ! regu la tions p. 39.; /Lidrd.sXH/d.' Ib id . p. 192.
29 L ab o u r Code ; 13. (1) and  Decree o f th e  M in is te ro f L ab o u r A ffairs 29/1979. (X U . 1.) 
MüM § 4. (2)
39 Tu777d^6*drAözy.' In te rn a ! o rg an isa tio n  an d  o p era tio n , p. 578.
3' Ad.sz/d 7/o77?d7t.' In te rn a !  regu lations, p. 23.
32 /du //dyc/777U7/c7*.' Collective ag reem en t, p. 33!.
33 Ad^z/d 7/o777Ú?7. In te rn a ! regu la tions, p. 3.
3* .I /7-.S. 7du //N(/¿/77707^ .  Ib id . p. 318 319. and p. 342.
33 Act Xr. 1. of 1971 on t h e  Coucils, ; 28. (1)
130 CSILLA LEHOCXKY
зч Tmnd.s NárMzy.' C odification  p a p e r  to  th e  m odifieation  o f  L a b o u r  Code. (M anus- 
c rip t.)  1978. p . 28.
3? Ifotttdtt.' R ig h t to  g ive  in s tru c tio n s . p . 174.
за Оум/я L'örst.' L aw  of ob liga tions. G enera l P a r t .  U n ifo rm  te x tb o o k  fo r u n iv e rs ity  
facu lties o f L aw . P u b lish e r o f  T ex tb o o k s. B u d ap es t, 1978. p . 21.
3s Ib id . p . 21.
3« LdasM Яомпн .' T h e  in te rn a l regu lá t ions p . 11.
3t Вида —//<vWu. T ex tb o o k  o f In te rn a tio n a l Law . P u b lish e r o f  T ex tb o o k s (T an k ö n y v - 
k iadó), B u d a p es t, 1995.
EINIGE MIT DEM INNEREM STATUTEN DES UNTERNEHMENS 
ZUSAMMENHÄNGENDE THEORETISCHE FRAGEN
von
FR A U  L E U O C Z K Y  C SILLA  K O L L O N A Y  
U n iv ersitiitso b erass is tcn tin
(Z usam m enfassung)
O er e rs te  T eil A bh an d lu n g  ste llt d ie H a g e , ob  das R ech t u n d  d ie rech tliche  R egelung  
ü b e rh au p t P la tz  in n erh a lb  d e r U ntét nehm en hitben. Oie A n tw o rt d a ra u f  is t b e jah en d , weil 
die E rh ö h u n g  d e r S e lb ständ igkeit des U nternehm ens, die V erw irk lichung  d e r se lb ständ igen  
V errechnung  d e r inneren  E in h e iten , d ie in an e r k om pliz ie rte r w eidenden  inneren  V e rh ä lt­
nisse d ie G a ran tie ru n g  d e r W irkungskreise , R ech te  und V erpflich tungen  d u rch  R e ch tsm itte l 
bean sp ru ch en .
Im  folgenden T eil b esch äftig t sich die S tud ie  m it d e r D iskussion  in  d e r F a c h lite ra tu r , 
ob  die e inzelnen  inneren  S ta tu te n  zum  A rb e its rech t, bzw. zu e inen  an d eren  R echtszw eig  
gehören . Oie V erfasserin  sch ließ t sich  d e r A nschauung  a n , n ach  d e r m an  innét h a lb  d e r O rg a­
n isa tio n  zwischen den  dem  In teresscn sch u tz  d ienenden  a rb e its rech tlich en  N orm en und d e ­
nen. d ie sieh n ich t a u f  das A rb e itsv erh ä ltn is  zwischen zwei P erso n en  beziehen, e inen  U n te r­
schied m achen  m uß. Oie le tz te ren  nennt m an  rech tliche oder u n tern eh m en srech tlich e  
N orm en.
Viole V erfasser b eh au p ten , d aß  d a s  eine oder an d ere  S ta tu t  e inem  den R ech tsteg e ln  
nah e  steh en d en  U h a rak te r h a t,  w eil es in d e r Z u k u n ft zu befolgende N orm en e n th ä lt  und  
so, d a s  fü r  d ie R eeh tstegeln  ch ara k te ris tisch e  h y p o thetische  E lem en t in  ihnen  zu finden  ist, 
w e ite rh in  d a ru m , weil sie a u f  G ru n d  gesetz licher V erfügungen erlassen  w urden . Oie A b ­
h a n d lu n g  d isk u tie rt m it diesen A nschauungen u n d  e rö rte r t,  d a ß  die in n eren  S ta tu te n  n ich t 
zum  G ebiet de r R echtsschaffung , sondern  zu r R ech tsan w en d u n g  g ehören . Im  Z usam m en­
han g  m it de r Form  der S ta tu te n  h ä lt  sie prinzip iell im G egensatz  zum  h eu te  h e rrschenden  
arb e its rech tlich en  S ta n d p u n k t d ie F orm  d e r V ereinbarung , oder des V ertrages, als M ethode 
des Z u standekom m ens de r e inzelnen S ta tu te n  fü r richtig .
НЕКОТОРЫЕ ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ВОПРОСЫ ВНУЕРЕННЕГО 
УСАТВА ПРЕДПРИЯТИ
ЛЕХОЦКИНЕ КОЛЛОНАИ ЧИЛЛА
В даниоИ работе сначала ставится вопрос имеет ли вообще .место внутри пред­
приятия право, правовое регулирвоание. Ответ на этот вопрос положительным, 
так как повышение самостоятельности предприятий, осуществление хозрасчета во 
внутренних едининах, усложнившиеся внутренние отношения требуют гарантии 
соблюдения компетенций, прав и обязанностей, посредством правовых средств.
Следующая часть работы посвящена дискуссии в снеилитературе в связи с тем, 
входят ли отдельные внутренние нормы в трудовое право или в другую отрасль права. 
Автор присоединяется к тому мнении), согласно которому внутри организации не-
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обходимо различать нормы трудового права, касающиеся защиты интересов трудя­
щихся от норм, касающихся неколлективных трудовых отношений. Последние нормы 
называются организационными, правовыми нормами или же правовыми нормами 
предприятия.
Многие авторы придают тому или иному уставу характер, приближающий его 
к правовым нормам по той причине, что он содержит соблюдаемые в будущем нор,мы, 
т.с. в них можно найти гипотетический элемент, характерный для правовых норм' 
а далее еще и потому, что они были изданы путем законодательского распоряжения. 
Автор данной работы вступает в спор с этими взглядами и излагает, что внутренние 
уставы относятся не к области пдаоопюодчссщоа, а к области п/7н,мсненая пдаоа. 
В связи с формой уставов автор в качестве способа создания отдельных уставов ечн- 
)аст принципиально правильно!! контрактную форму по сравнению с действительным 
положением трудового права.
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